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ABSTRACT
This meta-communicative study provides an analysis of global interfaith dialogue as it
pertains to peace and conflict, with a primary focus on Islam. The Islamic Republic of Iran and
United States have a complicated history. Their diplomatic relationship is rife with manipulation,
radicalism, and a disregard for human dignity. Currently, the US is imposing hundreds of
sanctions and restrictions on Iran, from nuclear energy to medicine, as a result of President
Trump’s decision to back out of the Iran Deal. However, other forms of dialogue are affecting
positive relations between the two countries. Interfaith dialogue between North American
Mennonites and Iranian Shia Muslims are mending the gaps in international diplomacy. As a
result, this research provides a collection of scholarly opinions on interfaith dialogue as a tool for
peacemaking in the context of Iran as an Islamic Republic. In doing so, this analysis includes an
intimate focus on the perspectives of Shia Muslims in Iran regarding Western prejudice against
Islam, Islamic conceptions of peace and pluralism, the intersection of religion and government,
and their country’s relationship to the United States. The goal of this research is to argue the
importance of religious literacy regarding relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran and to
support an avenue for further development in peacemaking between Iran and the US.
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INTRODUCTION
As a sacred system of beliefs and practices, religion has the power to influence
individuals’ and societies’ ways of thinking and acting. Political leaders have manipulated this
power to promote and exacerbate conflict, particularly when different religious systems confront
one another. The relationship between violence and religion, for Islam in particular, became a
fundamental concern for scholars and politicians following the reprehensible attacks on the
World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001 (Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009). Following
these heinous attacks, Islam has become the face of antagonism in the American socio-political
climate, replacing the post-Cold War scapegoat of communism. That being said, the attacks on
9/11 were by no means representative of Islam as a whole, in the same way that the Ku Klux
Klan is not representative of Christianity. Nonetheless, American ideological representations of
Islam have heavily misconstrued Western culture’s understanding of Islam, specifically as it
pertains to peace and conflict.
Islam is deeply involved in the social conceptions of both peace and conflict: Islamic
texts address notions of peace, dictate when war is justified, and how conflicts are resolved in
Islamic societies (Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009). Muslim perspectives on peace, conflict, religious
pluralism, and interfaith dialogue are all derivatives of peace as a holistic concept. An Islamic
conception of peace is established through an understanding of the Qur’an, the Hadith (written
accounts of the Prophet Mohammed’s sayings), and the Sunnah (the Prophet Mohammed’s
deeds/doings) (Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009). Through the compilation of these religious bodies,
one can gain a preliminary understanding of what peace means within the scope of Islam.
Today’s socio-political context in Western society (e.g. post 9/11 America, the election
of President Donald Trump) has deterred individuals from understanding Muslim perspectives.
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However, interfaith dialogue has become a powerful tool for both Muslims and non-Muslims in
the United States and abroad. Religious pluralism and interfaith dialogue are vitally important to
Muslims, especially for those living in countries where Islam is a religious minority (Hussain,
2003). Politically speaking, the United States has had various unstable interactions with the
minority Muslim populations within the country, in addition to orchestrating a multitude of
manipulative actions with Muslim majority countries in the Middle East (including, but by no
means limited to, the Islamic Republic of Iran).
Since President Trump’s decision to pull out of the Iran Nuclear Deal, the United States
has re-imposed all sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran, in addition to the inclusion of
nearly 700 new entities, including banks, individuals, and vessels (Borak & Gaouette 2018).
Current Secretary of State Mike Pompeo declares that the US goal in implementing these
increased sanctions is to “starve [the Iranian] regime” and “restore democracy” in Iran (Borak &
Gaouette 2018). Critics however contend that in doing so the United States is dividing itself from
European allies, gambling in the oil markets, deepening the humanitarian suffering of the Iranian
people, and severely deterring Iranian moderates who are open to working with the US (Borak &
Gaouette 2018). Although the US is attempting to put pressure on the Iranian government, it is
the Iranian people who are truly suffering at the hands of American dominance and greed.
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, Dr. Seyed Kazem Sajjadpour, asserts that Trump and his
supporters are projecting a “narrow minded definition of American nationalism which negates
the interests of the rest of the world” and perpetuates US hegemony (O’Toole, 2018). The
American nationalism and hegemony that Sajjadpour references is built on anti-immigrant and
anti-Islam, exclusivist attitudes that are isolating Americans from one another and the rest of the
world.
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In an attempt to foster world peace and the dignity of human life for all Americans and
Iranians, this research argues the following: A constructive way to facilitate and reestablish a
positive relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran is for American scholars and government
officials to engage in interfaith dialogue. An interfaith aspect to peace building is essential to an
understanding of the Islamic Republic and must be examined through both Islamic and nonIslamic lenses. Although the complicated history of distrust and manipulation underlie actions
carried out by both countries, ownership must be taken for the detriment that past administrations
have inflicted on the Iranian and American people. A meta-communicative analysis of interfaith
dialogue, made possible by Mennonite Central Committee and the International Institute for
Islamic Studies, also provides insight into the possibility of re-establishing and maintaining
peace between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
In order to argue this point effectively, this research includes an analysis of the following:
the socio-political portrayal of Iran and Islam as “other” in Western media; Islamic perspectives
on peace, pluralism, and interfaith dialogue; the implementation of interfaith dialogue as a
peacemaking tool and its intersection with politics; and lastly, a meta-communicative account of
a 2018 interfaith learning tour in Iran. A theoretical framework is also provided to educate the
reader on the importance of addressing diplomacy between the United States and Iran with
religious literacy and cultural understanding, the role that the US government and media has
played in demonizing Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the concepts of “othering” and
Orientalism. Including all of these aspects begets an accurate, critical analysis of the
intersections between religion and international diplomacy.

6

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This research is analytically framed in the cultural studies approach to religious literacy. The
cultural studies approach itself is based upon three assertions outlined by Religious Studies
scholars: religions are internally diverse; religions evolve and change over time, and religious
influences are embedded in all elements of culture (Moore 2015). When analyzing peace and
interfaith dialogue from a Muslim perspective, one must recognize that there is no single Muslim
perspective. The ideal type of the Muslim or Christian perspective recognizes that there is
internal diversity and often conflict within any and all religious belief systems. Therefore, the
ideal type of the Muslim perspective is based upon specific accounts of Muslim scholars and, for
this particular research, places an emphasis on Twelver-Shiism in Iran. In addition to being
internally diverse, religions also evolve and change over time. The rituals, symbols, and
ideologies of Muslims and Christians today are not the same as they were 50 years ago or at the
time of their inception. The history of peace and conflict between and within various religious
systems change how religions are practiced and how they relate to one another. Lastly, religion
influences all elements of culture. For example, the intersectionality of religion, politics, and
culture are extremely relevant to Iran as an Islamic Republic. An understanding of the above
three assertions of religious literacy then lay the foundation for the cultural studies approach.
According to Moore (2015) there are four components to the cultural studies approach that
allow for a critical, cross-cultural analysis based on religious literacy. First, the cultural studies
approach is inherently interdisciplinary. Religious scholars recognize that cultural, political,
economic, and religious lenses all coincide and act intrinsically upon one another (Moore 2015).
Therefore, it is pertinent to offer not only a religious studies analysis, but also an analysis of
culture, politics, history, economics, etc. One cannot understand Iranian politics or culture
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without also understanding Shia Islam. Second, the cultural studies approach is conducted on the
basis of religious “situatedness.” Situatedness refers to the assumption that all knowledge claims
are situated within a particular socio-historical context (Moore, 2015). Knowledge claims made
by current religious and/or political figures are framed within and stated as a result of the current
socio-historical context. This notion of situatedness is applied to both religious claims and
researched texts and source materials. As a result, what is considered relevant to global society,
whether researched by scholars in the field, officially stated by a political leader, or simply
discussed by the general public, is in fact situated.
Third, within the cultural studies model there is a recognition and analysis of power
dynamics. The issue of power vs. powerlessness involves not only the key players, but also key
perspectives and ideologies (Moore, 2015). Consequently, when analyzing the context of
interfaith dialogue in Iran as a Western researcher, there must be an examination of the unequal
power relationship between the United States and Islamic Republic of Iran. Furthermore, an
emphasis on not only Western but also Islamic perspectives of dialogue, peace, and conflict
resolution is necessary. The fourth and final component of the cultural studies model asserts that
cultural norms are fluid and socially constructed. Religion exists as an unfixed type built on
belief systems, which are constantly interpreted and reinterpreted by their believers. Just as
gender, race, ethnicity, and socio-economic class are all elements of cultural interpretation, so
too is religion (Moore, 2015). Culture and religion have a dialectical relationship. Therefore an
understanding of religion as a situated, fluid, and culturally embedded phenomenon is imperative
to understanding its role in society.
In addition to conducting this research through the lens of the cultural studies approach to
religious literacy, there is also an underlying framework of social “othering” and the social
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construction of the stranger. The way in which both societies and individuals address that which
is unfamiliar or strange is relevant to today’s global society. With the consistent increase of
globalization, the intersection of different religious, cultural, ethnic, and racial groups is
inevitable. But how does one respond to these new global social dynamics and how does that
response influence their social relationship? Academics, such as social theorist Georg Simmel,
have studied these questions for centuries.
In Simmel’s essay The Stranger (1908), he addresses the concept of social distance and
how it affects our perception of the stranger. Simmel writes:
“There is a kind of "strangeness" that rejects the very commonness based on something
more general which embraces the parties. The relation of the Greeks to the Barbarians is
perhaps typical here, as are all cases in which it is precisely general attributes, felt to be
specifically and purely human, that are disallowed to the other. But "stranger," here, has
no positive meaning; the relation to him is a non-relation; he is not what is relevant here,
a member of the group itself. As a group member, rather, he is near and far at the same
time, as is characteristic of relations founded only on generally human commonness. But
between nearness and distance, there arises a specific tension when the consciousness
that only the quite general is common, stresses that which is not common. In the case of
the person who is a stranger to the country, the city, the race, etc., however, this noncommon element is once more nothing individual, but merely the strangeness of origin,
which is or could be common to many strangers. For this reason, strangers are not really
conceived as individuals, but as strangers of a particular type…”

Simmel (1908) argues that physical distance also creates social distance, or a perceived barrier
that deters us and brings us further away from mutual social interaction. When relating to that
which is far or unfamiliar, such as a “stranger to the country,” the stranger is not conceived of as
an individual, but rather a foreigner: a stranger “of a particular type” (Simmel, 1908). Simmel
(1908) states that “stranger” in this context “has no positive meaning.” When encountering a
stranger of this type a sense of tension develops, due to the fact that the social relationship is
purely founded on “general human commonness.” Interactions, such as this, highlight to the
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observer that which is un-common or different, creating social distance between the actors.
When being human is the only perceived commonality, people often become consumed by
(visible) differences in race, ethnicity, religion, etc. Therefore social distance, as it relates to the
foreigner, strips the stranger of their individuality and socially marks them as ‘other.’
Simmel (1908) references the relationship between the Greeks and Barbarians as example
of the stranger as a foreigner; however, the same can be said for Americans and Iranians and/or
Christians and Muslims. The religious landscape of the United States is increasingly changing.
Although originally established by and primarily populated with Protestant Christians, the US is
currently home to 3.45 million Muslims, a figure that has been steadily increasing over the past
decade (Mohamed, 2018). The introduction of an unfamiliar religion has caused many Christians
to respond to the increase in Muslim individuals as strange, other, and (to some) threatening. The
same cannot necessarily be said for Americans and Iranians as social groups. Current limitations
on travel, such as visa denials and the infamous Muslim Ban, are currently keeping most
Americans and Iranians both physically and socially distant. The beliefs about the other are
therefore dominated by outside interest groups who control society’s acquisition of knowledge.
These interest groups, often media/news outlets and official government stances, assert their
knowledge claims about the other without ever being checked or challenged. As a result, social
groups like Iranians and Muslims fall into Simmel’s category of the stranger, or a foreign other.
One of the West’s most recurring images of the stranger/other is the Orient. Edward Said
(1978) coined the term Orientalism to refer to the particular lens through which the West views
and interacts with the Eastern World, or the Orient. Said (1978) considers the Near Orient as “the
lands of the Arab Near East, where Islam was supposed to define teal and racial characteristics.”
The Near Orient essentially includes parts of Northern Africa as well as the span of Turkey,
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across the Arabian Peninsula and the Old Persian Empire (commonly referred to in the Western
World as the Middle East), to India. Orientalism is Western domination and influence over the
Orient (Said, 1978), typically stemming from underlying ethnocentric attitudes. The power
dynamic between the Islamic Republic of Iran and United States also reflects this complex
hegemony. Said (1978) argues that, “from the beginning of the nineteenth century until the end
of World War II, France and Britain dominated the Orient and Orientalism; [however, since
then] America has dominated the Orient, and approaches it as France and Britain once did (Said,
1978). This tradition of Western ethnocentric dominance has played into the collective
consciousness of Americans. Not only does Orientalism create a fantasy of the generalized
inferior “other,” but also plays a role in constructing the Western self as “superior.” Harkening
back to Simmel’s work, the dichotomy of civilization (the Greeks) vs. barbarism (the Barbarians)
also comes into play. For example, the West has appointed itself as the civilized, savior of
democracy for the world (despite its clear political and social flaws). As a result the West has
justified colonizing and taking advantage of the Orient through a distorted self-actualizing lens
of false superiority. Orientalism has played an influential role in the US relationship to the
Islamic Republic of Iran. The US has taken advantage of Iran and the Iranian people politically,
socially, and economically. Iran and Islam are considered part of the Orient and therefore an
‘other’ in eyes of the United States.
The concepts of Orientalism and ‘othering’ involve the binary labeling of us versus them.
Our primitive neural systems deal in binaries as a means of survival: for example, denoting the
concepts of good vs. bad and pain vs. pleasure (Dozier, 2002). From an evolutionary perspective,
developing us-them divisions is a natural biological process that emerges from basic survival and
therefore is not inherently problematic. However, all us-them separations have the potential to
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develop into hate or anger during times of stress and conflict (Dozier, 2002). This is because usthem differentiation, although a helpful tool for primitive survival, can develop in-group/outgroup stereotyping when examined in modern, global society. Those that are not considered “us”
or the in-group, are inevitably considered “other.” Those of the in-group do not concern
themselves with the consternations (or at most times even the existence) of the other; they are
often viewed with indifference and at times vague hostility (Dozier, 2002). Even indifference is
rife with a lack of empathy that, when tested by conflict, can lead to destructive stereotyping
tendencies.
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METHODOLOGY
After receiving IRB approval from Kutztown University of Pennsylvania on April 3rd
2018, I traveled to the Islamic Republic of Iran to act as a participant observer for an interfaith
tour organized by the Hikmat International Institute for Oriental Wisdom and Spiritualty. In
addition to acting as a participant observer in group interviews and interfaith exchanges, I also
interviewed additional subjects for the purpose of this study. In total the sample consisted of 15
individuals (13 male and 2 female). Although the sample size is small, nearly all of the
individuals formally interviewed were heavily involved in interfaith dialogue practices as both
scholars and participants for years. Unfortunately the sample only consists of two females,
primarily due to the fact that Muslim women are not permitted to high ranking religious
positions, such as sheiks or ayatollahs. Additionally, most established Iranian religious scholars
are men (although according to the president of the University of Religions and Denominations,
currently more than fifty percent of overall Iranian university admissions are women), and the
individuals who organized the interviews for this Iranian learning tour were also all men. The
women interviewed (one a Muslim Iranian and the other a Christian American) were both
married to men who are either currently or were previously employed at interfaith dialogue
centers. That being said, the comments of a number of everyday Iranian women, who were not
officially interviewed, are also included in this research study.
Group interviews were pre-established by the Hikmat Institute and applied to half of the
interview subjects. These meetings were conducted in universities and other institutes, and lasted
for several hours. Many of the group interviews took place over coffee and snacks or lunch. The
majority (9/14) of interview participants were Iranian Shia Muslims, including very high-ranking
religious scholars (e.g. asheik and an ayatollah). Iranian subjects primarily consisted of
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professors, university presidents, and religious scholars/clergy. Representatives of a few minority
religious groups in Iran were also interviewed. All interviews taking place in the Islamic
Republic of Iran were carried out April 7-22, 2018. Due to travel constraints, some interviews
involved follow-up email interviews after meeting and developing prior contact with the
participant. This was the case for five Iranian professors/religious scholars. In some cases, email
communication continued from April-September 2018. The remaining two (out of the fourteen)
interview subjects were American Christians who have participated extensively in interfaith
dialogue in Muslim majority regions. Interviews with American subjects were conducted in the
US between August-September 2018. These interviews were audio recorded and took place over
lunch or coffee, lasting approximately one hour each. During participant observation and one-onone interviews conducted in Iran, data was recorded via handwritten notes. Interaction with local
Iranian participants was subject to chance opportunities, as they arose. Such interactions with
local Iranian participants took place in public spaces, such as coffee shops, hotel lobbies and
cultural/religious tourist sites.
Individuals were not required to sign an informed consent form, due to the fact that many
participants in the Islamic Republic of Iran may feel suspicious of signing their names to an
official paper. Iranians may be reluctant to put their names to a document offered by an
American, even in the friendliest of situations. For this reason, informed consent was obtained
orally by means of communication with the researcher. As the researcher, I stated my position as
an undergraduate student, my research goals, and the purpose of the interview. Participants were
told that the purpose of the study was to collect and publish data on interfaith activity in the
Islamic Republic of Iran. The respondents then had the ability to decide whether they wished to
participate in the study, and could opt out of the interview at any point.
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Mennonite Engagement & Obtaining Access
Although the United States has had complicated and often negative relations with the
Islamic Republic of Iran, this political relationship does not preclude other forms of connection
between the two countries. The Mennonite community in North America, (in this particular case)
headed by the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), has established a religious and aid-based
connection with the country of Iran and its citizens. Following the 1990 Manjil-Rudbar
earthquake in northern Iran, MCC set out to establish connections with Iran through the Iranian
Red Crescent Society (IRCS) (Martin, 2014). Since then, MCC and IRCS have participated in
regular interfaith dialogue conferences, student exchanges, and cultural tours. Through this
extremely unique relationship, Mennonites (primary based in Pennsylvania, USA and Ontario,
Canada) have been able to foster global interfaith dialogue with the Islamic Republic of Iran, and
gain insight into both inter- and intra-state aspects of interfaith dialogue.
Mennonite socio-religious history emerged out of a context of peace, power, and
community. As evident in the Anabaptist tradition, Mennonite spirituality focuses heavily on
peaceful nonresistance as discussed in the Gospel. As faithful followers of Jesus, Mennonites
recognize peacemaking efforts and the eradication of injustice as fundamentally important and
extremely spiritual acts (Theissen, 2013). Additionally, the historical context of Mennonite
persecution has shaped the Mennonite worldview as it relates to the notions of power and
community. The extreme persecution that Mennonites faced in Europe has fortified a clear
dualism between church and state for many North American Mennonites (Theissen, 2013). In
addition to persecution as an example of power relations, these contextual elements also
influenced Mennonite spirituality to promote a distinct sense of community.
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Initially, the central focus of Mennonite peacemaking was the refusal to participate in
war, specifically the US military draft in World War II (Thiessen, 2013). Leading into the midlate 20th century, organizations such as Mennonite Central Committee continued to expand their
peace building efforts and global aid development. Mennonite conflict scholars have developed
peacebuilding practices that extend beyond picking up the pieces in the aftermath of conflict, to
addressing the root causes of conflict in tandem with supplying provisional aid and development
assistance (Theissen, 2013). This ideology toward peacebuilding practices is implemented by
MCC and many other Mennonite affiliated organizations.
The following research study could not have been conducted without the pre-established
relationship between North American Mennonites and Iranian Shia Muslims. As the researcher, I
was able to participate in the Iranian religious and cultural tour through my association with
James Street Mennonite Church and Lancaster Interchurch Peace Witness. Lancaster Interchurch
Peace Witness is a grassroots association dedicated to promoting justice, environmental
protection, and peaceful solutions to conflict. As a member of James Street Mennonite Church
(located in Lancaster City, PA), I had access to participation in the Middle East Interest Group of
the Lancaster Interchurch Peace Witness association. Ed Martin, a member of the Middle East
Interest Group, former Eastern Mennonite University professor and director for the Center for
Interfaith Engagement, and former MCC director for Central & South East Asia organized the
tour from the North American side. Martin has lead three similar tours and visited the Islamic
Republic of Iran roughly 15 times. That being said, Martin attributes the success of the Iranian
learning tours to the status of the International Institute for Islamic Studies (IIIS) in Iran and its
director, Dr. Mohammad Ali Shomali.
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RESULTS
Historical Context
Conflicts do not occur in a vacuum. There are always underlying factors in relation to the
context of the conflict that fuel feelings of blame, distrust, animosity, fear, hatred, and/or
ethnocentrism. Knowing the context enables peacemakers to not only predict the behaviors and
direction of the conflict, but also prevents them from applying unsuitable solutions that could
potentially exacerbate the conflict (Abdullah et al., 2016). In order to better understand how to
move forward in terms of diplomacy and peace between the US and Iran, there must first be a
critical analysis of the contextual factors most relevant to today’s socio-political context.
Peacemaking models recognize history, culture, religion, and media (among others) as contextual
factors that influence and shape the nature of conflict (Abdullah et al., 2016). The contextual
history of the relationship between Iran and the United States is arguably the strongest element
deterring both nations from moving forward together, peacefully [See Figure 1.1 in the Appendix
for a timeline of important conflict events in the history between the US and Iran].
When Americans examine their historic animosity toward Iran they typically fixate on the
embassy hostage crisis of 1979. On the other hand, Iranians trace their negative attitudes further
back to 1953, and the CIA and British Intelligence orchestrated overthrow of the democratically
elected Prime Minister of Iran, Muhammad Mossedegh. Mossedegh had socialist leanings and
plans to nationalize Iranian oil. Western Cold War politics and interests in the exploitation of
Middle Eastern oil sources lead the US to join Great Britain’s plans for a military coup. In July
1953 Western forces put those plans into effect and by August the Pahlavi Shah, Mohammad
Reza, whom the US regarded as their prime Iranian ally, was reinstated as the nation’s leader
(Axworthy, 2016). The overthrow of Mossedegh is rarely discussed in an American context,
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because many Americans have no knowledge of the event and government sentiment still
supports American intervention in Middle Eastern affairs. Ed Martin recalls discussing the
Mossedegh incident following an ecumenical delegation in 2007. During the delegation Martin
met with senators in Washington, which included James Jeffrey, who at the time was the
“number two person” in the Middle East Bureau. According to Jeffery, the overthrow of
Mossadegh was the “best thing” the US did for Iran.
Although US responsibility for the coup is not quite so straight forward, the CIA played
an indisputable role in suppressing democracy in Iran after the coup (Axworthy, 2016). Most
notably, the CIA was instrumental in forming the Shah’s secret police, SAVAK, which
oppressed Iranian freedom for the following quarter century (Axworthy, 2016). The Shah was
extremely disliked by the Iranian public for his cruelty and consolidation of wealth and power.
As the Shah’s power began to deteriorate and the senior Islamic clergy rose in opposition,
including the Ayatollah Khomeini, the US continued to support the Shah. The culminating event
of these conflicting forces was the Shah’s decision to flee to the United States for medical
treatment in January 1979, and President Jimmy Carter allowing him to seek refuge there. It was
then that the Ayatollah Khomeini was welcomed back to Iran and the Islamic Revolution came
to fruition. During this time many Iranians, whether members of the government or general
public, believed that American leaders were conspiring ways to consolidate power and reinstate
the Shah in Iran; a fear that, considering Iran’s history with the United States and the fact that
Western re-imposition of the Shah had previously occurred, is quite rational. However, the
Islamic Republic’s response to this Western threat resulted in the single most detrimental event
in Iran’s relationship to the United States, at least from an American perspective.
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The hostage crisis of 1979 was a direct result of the United States receiving the Shah for
asylum and medical treatment. At this point, Khomeini had appointed a Provisional Government
On November 4th a group of university student radicals occupied the US embassy building in
Tehran and detained the diplomatic staff, demanding that the “criminal, deposed Shah” be
returned to Iran (Axworthy, 2016). Images of hostages, handcuffed and blindfolded, flooded
American media. Within Iran, the embassy takeover ignited an atmosphere of radicalism and
calamity that renewed a sense of revolutionary fervor; Khomenei issued a statement on
November 5th praising the students’ act as a “second revolution” and insinuating that the
embassy take over had a layer of espionage, which was helped by the release of documents
obtained in the US embassy linking his more liberal opponents to contacts with the US
(Axworthy, 2016). It was not until January 1981, as the new US president Ronald Reagan
finished his inaugural address, that Khomeini’s government officially released the embassy
hostages. By releasing the hostages at this moment, Khomeini reiterated the purely political
stance he took in this crisis. For Khomeini and the Islamic Republic of Iran, putting politics
above the ethical treatment of human beings had immeasurable consequences. The hostage
situation has colored the view of Iran so badly that it has become the overarching radical image
of Iran and Shiism for nearly every American politician, not to mention the general American
public.
Although the overthrow of Mossedegh and the US hostage crisis were not in any way the
only contextual factors in the conflict relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the
United States, they are extremely salient and reflective of the way that Iranians and Americans
related to one another’s shared past. The political differences between the United States and Iran
have (at least in the case of North America) been cast as differences in culture and religion.
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Specifically, the political-economic sources of tensions are shrouded by claims of fundamental
difference (i.e. Iranians are violent Muslims living in a backward culture). The US paints itself as
a righteous, civilized society by casting Iranians as barbarian ‘others, harkening back to
Simmel’s (1908) work. As a result, the US involvement in Iran and its negative impact (e.g. the
overthrow of Mossadegh, the support of the Pahlavi Shahs, economic sanctions, etc.) are
conveniently left out of the conversation. The obligation is put on both governments to
acknowledge and take ownership for past mistakes, and to honestly seek forgiveness and peace
rather than vindictively holding on to the damage that has already been done. When attitudes that
are dictated by Cold-War politics and ethnocentric biases still prevail in American politics it is
nearly impossible to move forward. Additionally, allowing Iranian politics to dictate the ethical
treatment of civilians is unacceptable for peaceful reconciliation. These damages made by past
administrations are reflected in the socio-historical context of the conflict, which includes the
influences of religion, politics, and the media.

Iran & Islam as ‘Other’
Western Media Framing
Regardless of increasing globalization and developments in technology, the vast majority
of people around the world do not travel internationally (Saleem, 2007). For this reason, media
and news outlets play an essential role in shaping the public’s impression of other countries and
ethnic groups. The United States has a history of portraying foreign countries and people through
a skewed lens: exaggerating or marginalizing certain issues, providing selective information, and
exaggerating enemy nation’s power to garner support from policy makers and the general public;
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US coverage of the 1991 Gulf War, 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, and 2003 invasion of Iraq are
just a few examples of this trend (Saleem, 2007).
The Islamic Republic of Iran is no exception to US foreign country image-framing.
Framing is used to communicate certain aspects of a perceived reality more saliently than others,
in order to evoke and advance a particular interpretation (Entman, 1993; Saleem, 2007). Despite
the reality that Western people do not possess much reliable information on the Islamic Republic
or the Iranian people, striking images of angry men in turbans and crowds with burning flags
often come to Americans’ minds. Western media reporting repeatedly stresses elements of
Iranian culture as abnormal, irrational, and dangerously problematic (Axworthy, 2013). By
framing Iran in such an unnatural light and reporting heavily on items of protest and anomie, the
US has managed to establish a particular image-frame through which the American public
conceptualizes Iran.
In their book on US press coverage of Iran between 1951-1978, Dorman & Fahrang
(1987) found that American media sources built images of Iran based on different eras of US
foreign policy interests, in the hope of shaping public sentiment in the government’s favor.
During the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah, Iran was a strategic ally to the US, despite the Shah’s
implicit consolidation of wealth and the countless human rights violations he carried out against
the Iranian people. By 1978 Iran became America’s largest non-NATO recipient of economic aid
and weapons. Additionally, Iran was home to more than forty thousand working US military and
civilian personnel (Dorman & Fahrang, 1987). However, this relationship changed drastically
once the Shah could no longer serve as a puppet for US interest in the Middle East and the
Islamic Revolution came to fruition. Policy makers and the press asserted that Khamenei’s
government represented fanatic Islamic fundamentalism and exported terrorism (Saleem, 2007).
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This sentiment continued into the 21st century, as the United States became increasingly and
irresponsibly involved in Middle Eastern affairs. During his State of the Union Address in 2002,
President George W. Bush declared Iran a member of the “Axis of Evil,” along with Iraq and
North Korea. Bush and his administration used the metonymic phrase “Axis of Evil” to evoke
images of Nazism, fascism, and satanic forces (Heradstveit & Bonham, 2007). The image
shaping of the Iranian nation as the antithesis to world peace interests therefore runs along the
lines of skewed US political self-interest.
Not only has the US framed the image of Iran as a foreign nation, but also the host of a
foreign religion. Anti-Muslim sentiment and scapegoating has been the overwhelming theme in
Western media since the end of the Cold War (Saleem, 2007). For the United States in particular,
it was the Iranian Revolution that galvanized anti-Muslim sentiment. Mughees-uddin (1995)
asserts that the “Islamic Character” projected by Western media portrays Islam as a threat to
American peace and security, and Iran the pinnacle of terrorist Islamic fundamentalism.
Furthermore, Mughees-uddin (1995) argues that the US media has purposefully attempted to
evoke conflict and misunderstanding between Christians and Muslims by framing Christianity as
a religion of tolerance and free market economics, and Islam as an impediment to social
freedom. The ideology of Islam and Iran as a direct adversary to American values is also evident
in US media coverage of the hostage crisis in 1979. Although the incident was extremely
damaging for the US, it was Shia Islam rather than the actions or inactions carried out by the
Iranian government that was targeted as the true enemy. During coverage of the hostage crisis,
ABC commenter Frank Reynolds made comments to affirm that Iranian Muslims are fueled by
hatred. Over a crowd of Iranians chanting, “God is great,” Reynolds contended that the real
meaning was “Hatred of America” (Saleem, 2007). When political rhetoric turns to attacking and
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generalizing an entire religion, it entirely reframes the conversation and widens the gap of
mistrust and misrepresentation.

Iranian Perspectives
The US media projection of Iran as a country full of radical Islamic militants is very
clearly visible to the Iranian people as well. Ordinary Iranians even joke with the few American
tourists they come across asking if they have “met any terrorists yet.” The son-in-law and
representative of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani argues that American media sources associate
Iran and Islam with terrorist groups such as ISIS. Notwithstanding, one of the biggest frustrations
or fears Iranian’s have with the US representation of their country is framing Iran and its citizens
as backwards (Erdbrink & Fanning, 2018). The Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister asserts that
America’s hegemonic media distorts the image of Iran and projects the country as socially,
politically, and religiously “abnormal” (Erdbrink & Fanning, 2018). He continues that the
relationship of distrust and suspicion between Iran and the West has only been exacerbated by
this misrepresentation.
Over the past year there have been a number of demonstrations in Iran and the reality of
their manifestation has not been clearly reported by mainstream Western sources. Iranians
understand that these demonstrations represent a lot of the tension that is brewing within their
society and the severe pressure that the Iranian government is currently under. Nevertheless,
many of the Iranians who were interviewed indicated that these protests have been highly
exaggerated by the US media, and have a heavier focus on the economy than social issues.
Iranian religious scholars who were interviewed are quoted saying: “Due to the very unfair US
sanctions against [our country], there has been more economic pressure on the lower classes in

23

Iran and this led to some demonstrations;” “The protests began as primarily economic and they
were supported by many conservatives loyal to the system.” What began as economic also turned
to a protest of ongoing social issues, namely that of women and the compulsory hijab.
Furthermore, when it comes to the issue of freedom of speech in a religious state such as Iran,
the lines of social, political, and economic protest tend to blur together.
That being said, Iranians recognize the need for governmental transparency. This
includes both the transparency of the Iranian government to listen and respond to demonstrations
in an ethical manor and for the US to cover and report on such global demonstrations ethically as
well. Sheikh Morteza Rezazadeh proclaims, “I personally hope that the whole world including
my own country will be more tolerant and provide higher freedom of speech and other types of
freedom for people. In my opinion the current situation is not ideal in any country including the
United States and Iran. But according to the law, people are free to talk and criticize the
authorities and men of power as long as it is not a hate speech or is not insulting. Being
committed to this law by the governmental officials and all other people is something that I
believe needs a lot of improvements.” Regardless of the fact that the governments of both the
United States and Islamic Republic of Iran should improve their transparency, that does not
justify the violation of human rights.
Because the Islamic Republic has been the target of ethnic and religious discrimination
by the United States, Iranian religious leaders have called upon Muslim youth in Western nations
to separate political bias from an understanding of religious truth. In his message to the youth of
North America and Europe following the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, Ayatollah Khamenei
(2015) addressed how the West has manipulated the image of Islam and questions Western
incentives to cast Islam as a threat:
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“Many attempts have been made over the past two decades, almost since the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, to place [Islam] in the seat of a horrifying enemy…
Why is it that attempts are made to prevent public awareness regarding an important issue
such as the treatment of Islamic culture and thought? You know well that humiliation and
spreading hatred and illusionary fear of the ‘other’ have been the common base of all
those oppressive profiteers… Why does the power structure in the world want Islamic
thought to be marginalized and remain latent? What concepts and values in Islam disturb
the programs of super powers and what interest are safeguarded in the shadow of
distorting the image of Islam?”
Khamenei (2015) attempts to rectify this negative image shaping by requesting two actions of
young Western Muslims: first, to research the incentives behind the derogatory framing of Islam;
and second, to gain direct knowledge of Islam through primary and original sources.
At the core of the shift in ties between the US and Iran, as well as the following four
decades of antithetical socio-political encounters, is a lack of understanding and subsequent
misrepresentation of Islamic culture, tradition, values, and ideology by Western powers (Saleem,
2007). If one does not take active participation in considering the perspective of the other it is
nearly impossible to make amends. Current and past Western rhetoric on Shia Islam has clearly
damaged the relationship between the United States and Islamic Republic of Iran. Therefore it is
impossible to forgo Islamic perspectives moving forward, if an actively favorable relationship
for both nations is achievable.

Peace, Pluralism, & Interfaith Activity in Islam
Despite the widespread narrative of Islam and Muslim communities as inherently violent,
scholarly works and cross-cultural historical analyses provide evidence to the contrary (AbuNimer, 2013; Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009; Said & Funk, 2001). An accurate representation of
Islam and its relationship to peace and conflict calls for insight from Muslim scholars who cite
Islamic texts and socio-historical Muslim tradition. Therefore the following details scholarly
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analyses of Islamic peace and conflict, religious pluralism, and interfaith dialogue. The
discussion of these topics also involves a basic understanding of terms and concepts central to
Islamic thought, such as jihad, ummah, tawhid, and ahl al-kitab among others. Not only is it
erroneous to proclaim Islam as inherently violent or non-violent without examining these topics,
but also if ethical and effective interfaith activity is to take place a basic understanding of peace,
pluralism, and interfaith dialogue from Islamic perspectives must be acknowledged.

Peace & Conflict
Misconceptions about the meaning of jihad and forced conversion have lead Westerners
to condemn Islam as militant. The term jihad, often translated as “holy war,” actually means,
“struggle.” In truth the phrase “holy war” originated with Christian Crusaders, who used it for
their own theological legitimacy for violence (Aslan, 2011). On the other hand, the “struggle”
that the Qur’an most often refers to is an inward struggle of the soul. There is both a greater and
a lesser jihad. The greater jihad religiously connotes the struggle for holiness, submission to
God, and an overcoming of sin; lesser jihad refers to “any exertion – military or otherwise –
against oppression and tyranny” (Aslan, 2011). Although the Qur’an does allow for war under
stringent conditions, such as fighting for justice with an emphasis and understanding for human
life, the preference is for nonviolence and sabr (patience) (Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009). The
Qur’an also forbids forced conversion stating, “There is no compulsion in religion: the Truth
stands clear from the Wrong” (2:256). This viewpoint is also evident in the Sunnah of the
Prophet. In 630 Muhammad returned to Mecca as the conquering ruler, along with his followers,
after years of migration and persecution. Amir Hussein (2003) provides a description of the
historic account:
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“[Muhammad] literally had the power of life and death over those who years earlier had
tormented and persecuted him and had killed several of his followers… In the most
triumphant of earthly moments, Muhammad chose to display the utmost mercy, and
declared total amnesty. In this extraordinary act, he came to those who had persecuted
him, and recited to them the words from the Qur’an that Joseph had first spoken to his
brothers when they came to him in Egypt, humbled after having sold him earlier into
slavery: ‘This day let no reproach be upon you. May God forgive you, and God is the
most merciful of those who show mercy’ (12:92). There would be no forced conversion
or slaughter of the Meccans.”
Not only have misinterpretations of Islamic concepts, such as jihad, been used to
perpetrate the image of Islam as a religion of violence, but also have been used against Muslims
by extremists who have risen to power as a result of Western influence and/or been supported
financially by Western powers. At times Islamic militants have manipulated the definition of
lesser jihad to promote social and political agendas, as apposed to true religious interests (Aslan,
2001). Despite the current narrative of fear and irrationalism, Americans and Europeans are not
the primary targets of terrorism. In another letter from Khamenei (2015) to youth in Western
countries he says, “The Muslim world has been victim to terrorism and violence more
extensively, on a much larger scale, and for a much longer time [than Western nations.]”
Additionally, the primary groups perpetrating terrorism (e.g. ISIS, the Taliban, and Al Qaeda)
have all at one point been either financially supported by the US or have risen to power partially
as a result of power vacuums created by US invasions and subsequent inadequate withdrawals
from Middle Eastern countries. Khamenei (2015) continues on this point arguing:
“Military campaigns targeting the Muslim world over recent years, which have taken
countless lives, are [an] example of the West’s contradictory logic… I consider the
imposition of the Western culture on other nations and belittling independent cultures as
a silent and very harmful act of violence. Humiliating rich cultures and insulting their
most respected parts are happening while the alternative culture is by no means qualified
to supplant them.”
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Statistics Global Terrorist Index compiled by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
support Ayatollah Khamenei’s claims. In 2015 the top ten countries affected by terrorism were
all located in either the Middle East, Africa, or Asia; Furthermore, over 72% of terrorist related
deaths occurred in just five of those countries (Dudley, 2016). The GTI defines terrorism as “the
threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political,
economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (Institute for
Economics and Peace, 2014). This is contrary to the common narrative of Western media, which
labels such violence as “terrorism” only when perpetrated by individuals of Middle Eastern
decent or those who affiliate themselves with Islam. That being said, it is not only important to
understand the reality of Islam’s misconstrued image, but also to familiarize oneself with true
Islamic conceptions of peace and conflict. In doing so one can develop a more realistic image of
Islam and attempt to eradicate religious prejudice.
In addition to examples from the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad, Shia Muslims in
particular typify the acts and deeds of Imam Ali, including his conceptions of war and peace.
According to Khamenei (2009), Imam Ali, “the lover of peace and security,” participated in acts
of war but strived for peacemaking whenever possible. Islamic theology does not necessarily
adhere to the ideology of pacifism, but instead upholds justice and the defense of freedom and
human rights. Accordingly, there are justifications for war under Islamic law, and evidence of
such in the Qu’ran, Hadith, and across Islamic history. Imam Ali sought out negotiation and
attempted to avoid bloodshed whenever possible, so that he might not act against the Prophet
Muhammad’s religion: Imam Ali said, “I will not begin fighting in a war unless I first ask the
enemy to arrive at an understanding… If they change their mind and repent, I will accept, and if
war is their only choice, I will ask for help from God and then fight them;” On another occasion
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Imam Ali said, “I analyzed the pros and cons of [fighting Mu’awiyah (the fifth Islamic/Sunni
Caliphate)] and I could not go to sleep anymore. Thus I saw no other choice but to fight him or
to deny Islam. As a cure I found war easier than the torture of giving it up, and I found death in
this world lighter than death in the other world” (Khamenei, 2009). In Imam Ali’s view,
engaging in war as a means of justice is staying true to Islam, as long as all contrary measures
are taken to avoid conflict. The choice posed by Imam Ali in Khamanei’s view is to deny the
righteousness that can be brought on by justice, or to deny Islam.
The term ummah, or religious community, is also essential to the understanding of
Islamic peace and peacemaking. Islamic thought developed from a tradition of communalism
and an emphasis on the greater good. In Muslim societies the common good comes before that of
the individual and as a result, individuals have an obligation toward the community (KadayifciOrellana, 2009). The notion of ummah, as a manifestation of divine living bound by human
collectivist interest, calls forth individuals to protect one another from harm. Therefore, conflict
is viewed as detrimental to both divine and communal harmony (Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009).
Furthermore, ummah is not exclusive to Muslims and Muslim communities. In verse 10:19 the
Qur’an states, “And [know that] all mankind were once but one single community, and only later
did they begin to hold divergent views. And had it not been for a decree – that had already gone
forth from thy Sustainer, all their differences would indeed have been settled [from outset].” The
Qur’an also says, “And indeed within every community **have We raised up** an apostle
[entrusted with this message]: ‘Worship God and shun the powers of evil!’ And among those
[past generations] were people whom God graced with His guidance…” (16:36). These verses
not only present humanity as a derivative of a single religious community, but also recognize that
the expanse of that single religious community is present throughout various societies and across
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generations; all religious communities are therefore considered an ummah (Shafiq & Abu-Nimer,
2007).

Pluralism & Interfaith Dialogue
As with any new religious tradition, Islam began as a minority and could not have
developed without the presence of interfaith dialogue (Hussain, 2003). Before the famous
emigration of Muhammad and his followers from Mecca to Medina in 622 A.D., there was a
lesser-known emigration to Abyssinia. This migration story is an example of religious pluralism
in early Islam and the cooperation of Christian and Muslim societies:
“As people began to accept Islam they met opposition from others in Mecca. This
opposition turned to physical persecution against certain members of the early Muslim
community. Muhammad gathered a group of those most vulnerable, and instructed them
to go across the Red Sea to Abyssinia, a Christian country ruled by a Christian king.
There, the emigrants were welcomed and accepted. Indeed, the Christian king protected
the Muslims against demands and extradition by the polytheists of Mecca. The emigrants
stayed in Abyssinia until they rejoined the larger Muslim community in Medina”
(Hussein, 2003).
The Sunnah or life of the Prophet Muhammad is considered exemplary for all Muslims (Hussein,
2003). Accordingly, accounts of interfaith interactions in Islamic history are fundamental to the
conceptualization of pluralism across time.
Islamic perspectives on religious pluralism can also be established through an
understanding of Islamic universalism. One of the core principles of Islam is the notion of
tawhid, meaning the oneness of Allah or the “Principle of Unity of God and all being”
(Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009; Said & Funk, 2001). Islamic monotheism is central to the shahada,
meaning testimony or declaration of faith. Shahada refers to the basic statement, “There is no
god but Allah, and Muhammad is his messenger,” which includes the declaration of tawhid (e.g.
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(There is no god but Allah”). Therefore tawhid is not just Islamic doctrine, but also an affective
center to Islam and a discursive act that Muslims take on wholeheartedly. Tawhid as a
fundamental grounding for Islamic thought inevitably shapes Islamic conceptions of peace,
harmony, and universality. Not only does the concept of tawhid dictate one’s personal
relationship to God, but also the relations and harmony of all God’s creation; The belief that
everything emanates from God establishes the foundation for Islamic universalism to include all
fellow human beings, regardless of the socially constructed identities they hold, such as race,
nationality, or gender (Said & Funk, 2001; Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009).
To acquire a holistic perspective of what religious pluralism means and is, one must also
understand what pluralism is not. In his book on Muslim and Christian dialogue, Amir Hussain
(2006) details two key themes of religious pluralism. First, pluralism does not mean diversity;
Individuals of differing faiths may live in the same area, but if there is no interaction or
engagement between them then there is no pluralism. Second, the goal of pluralism and interfaith
dialogue is not tolerance, but understanding. Tolerance is in this sense is nothing but
indifference. Genuine pluralism is based on shared knowledge and coexistence. The Qur’anic
term ta’arafu can be translated as knowing, understanding, or building relations (Shafiq & AbuNimer, 2007). Ergo, ta’arafu is the cornerstone of Islamic pluralism and interfaith dialogue.
Without a commitment to knowledge and open interaction there is no room for productive
growth and interaction between various religious groups. Islamic texts call on both Muslims and
non-Muslims to recognize their differences and learn from them.
Muslims are constantly reminded of their relationship to ahl al-Kitab or People of the
Book, commonly referring to Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians. People of the Book are those
who received an earlier revelation from God, and the Qur’an recognizes a peaceful coexistence
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between Muslims and those with a shared heritage and common God (Hussein, 2006): “And
argue not with the People of the Book unless it be in [a way] that is better, except with such of
them as do wrong; and say: ‘We believe in that which has been revealed to us and revealed to
you; our God and your God is One, and to God do we surrender” (29:46). The Qur’an promotes
such sharing with the People of the Book in the hope that it will result in peaceful exchanges and
mutual understanding (Shafiq & Abu-Nimer, 2007). Another verse from the Qur’an details the
righteousness of ahl al-Kitab: “Some of the People of the Book are a wholesome nation. They
recite God’s signs in the watches of the night, prostrating themselves, having faith in God and
the last day, bidding honor and forbidding dishonor, vying with one another in good deeds. They
are among the wholesome. Whatever good they do, they will not be denied its reward” (3:113115). Not only are Muslims reminded of their common relationship with People of the Book, but
also that these honorable and righteous non-Muslims will be rewarded for their faithfulness.
These basic concepts of Islamic peace should still be framed within the cultural studies
approach to religious literacy. All religious have a variety of beliefs that reflect the clashes and
schisms that come with internal diversity. The above ideals of peace are not accepted or
understood to the same degree by every Muslim. As previously stated, some may accept the ideal
type and others may reject it completely. The degree to which Muslims accept and understand
these concepts vary considerably, which can be said for every religion and denomination
worldwide. For example, many North American Mennonites consider themselves pacifists,
however not all Christians adhere to pacifism. Although an understanding of the basic Islamic
conceptions of peace and pluralism are extremely important, it is equally important to recognize
that individuals who practice Islam will not all adhere to these ideal beliefs.
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Interfaith Dialogue in Iran
When it comes to peace, conflict, and interfaith dialogue, Ayatollah Alavi Boroujerdi
argues that people of faith have an obligation to each other and humankind to come together and
denounce violence. Particularly during the current societal movements toward materialism,
Ayatollah Boroujerdi states that interfaith dialogue is of utmost importance. He continues, saying
the common point of all divine religions is that people are responsible for every action they take
in this world. Many of the wars and conflict around the world are carried out in the name of
religion. As a result of the violation of human ethical values emphasized in religion, millions are
suffering. Consequently, people of faith have a responsibility to reflect on the causes for war and
suffering in the world, and to determine what to do about them. Ayatollah Boroujerdi questions
people of faith asking, “Why are we still seeing so many violations [against people] when we
have thousands of mosques, synagogues, and churches?” At the same time, Ayatollah Boroujerdi
affirms that, “we should not limit ourselves to condemnation, but come together to find a
practical solution.” Therefore the goal that Ayatollah Boroujerdi poses is to make connections
between people and spread such ethical and moral values to all societies.
In addition to actively seeking connection between individuals of different faith
traditions, Iranian religious scholars often cite Qur’anic verses and Shia theology as their
framework for engaging in interfaith dialogue from an Islamic perspective. Verse 49:13 in the
Qur’an declares: “Oh humanity! Truly We created you from male and female, and made you into
nations and tribes that you might know one another. Truly, the most honored/noble of you in the
sight of God is the most God-conscious/righteous of you. Indeed, God is Knowing and
Acquainted.” Amir Hussain (2003) details four notable points in this verse that reflect the
Qur’anic view of pluralism and interfaith dialogue. First, the verse is addressed to all of
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humanity, not exclusively Muslims. Second, the creation and separation of people into different
nations is positively valued and purposefully comes from God. Third, the verse calls upon
humanity to transcend those differences in order to learn from one another, thus characteristic of
ta’arafu and Islamic pluralism. Last, the verse says that the best people are not necessarily
Muslim, but those who are righteous and know of God. Numerous Iranians, Islamic scholars, and
everyday Muslims (Hussein, 2006; Idliby, Oliver, & Warner, 2007; Shafiq & Abu-Nimer, 2007)
cite this particular Qur’anic verse as a cornerstone to Islamic perceptions of interfaith dialogue.
Morteza, a sheikh living in Qom who was interview for this study, notes that Islamic
mysticism plays a significant role in his conceptualization and engagement in interfaith
activities: “I find mysticism and spirituality a common language among all the religious.”
Islamic mysticism or Sufism is characterized by a sense of esoteric spirituality that can be
incorporated into Sunni and Shia interpretations, in addition to standing on its own. Sufism,
although practiced across the globe, is often associated with Iran and Shia Islam. For example,
Sufism greatly influenced Iranian literature and Shi’a philosophy (Pierce, 2008). Iran was also
the first region that Islam expanded to outside of the Arabian Peninsula. According to Hussein
(2003) it was the Sufis, or Islamic mystics, who can be credited with spreading Islam throughout
the Sasanian Empire of Persia; By living among the people and embracing an ideology of
worshiping God for God’s sake, Sufis provided a lasting example of how to live a Muslim
lifestyle. Even Ayatollah Khomeini adopted the philosophy of Islamic mysticism, writing Sufi
poetry about his longing to leave the classrooms of rigid Islamic study and go to the wine cellars
to drink the wine of God’s love. That being said, Morteza continues the explanation of his
interfaith beliefs:
“Islam as a branch of Abrahamic religions and a major religion with many theological,
historical, ethical, jurisprudential and mystical teachings has a lot in common with other
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major faith traditions and this has made a great ground to open the discussion. What is
important for me is to always try to manifest a very logical, moderate, ethical and
peaceful account of Islam, as I firmly believe that that is the reality of all the divine
religions including Islam. I think that the extremist and exclusivist approaches are
deviations that have happened in all the religions and it is upon all of us to try to express
our objection with those approaches and promote the true religion of God, which is based
on peace and leads to peace.”
For many individuals the basis of interfaith dialogue is finding common elements among
different religions. Dr. Amir Akrami contends that Islam and Christianity are not that different:
“Even if there are differences, we are still humans with the same commonalities and challenges.”
According to Dr. Muhammad Legenhausen (2016), a religious scholar and Shia Muslim convert
currently living in Iran, this is known as reductive pluralism. Although an important foundation
or steppingstone for those engaging in interfaith dialogue, reductive pluralism focuses on basic
similarities rather than a true understanding and appreciation for various religious traditions.
Legenhausen asserts that his interpretation of an Islamic perspective on interfaith dialogue “is
based on the idea that we need to respect our differences rather than trying to eliminate them.
Although I believe that Islam demands a commitment to its own superiority to other religions…
It is more important to further understanding than to convince others or to argue about relative
merits. I call this approach ‘non-reductive pluralism’.” Non-reductive pluralism highlights and
appreciates religious differences by recognizing them as unique divine qualities through which
God guides people (Legenhausen, 2016). Consequently, non-reductive pluralism provides an
honest and open environment for dialogue in a way that respects and values other religious
traditions.
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Intersection of Interfaith Dialogue & Politics
The process of interfaith dialogue between the Islamic Republic of Iran and United States
is complicated by the fact that the intersection of religion and politics plays vastly different roles
in the two countries. In the US, religion is supposed to have little to nothing to do with the
political sphere, though its informal presence is indisputable. However, the Iranian political and
religious systems are one in the same. As a result, Iranian religious leaders have much more
political power in their country than religious leaders do in the United States. Participants in the
dialogue process are then in distinct positions: Americans have little influence on politics in their
own country, whereas Iranian participants can have a direct impact. This complication sheds
light on the delicate intersection between religion and politics on a global scale, in addition to the
significance of its function in the dialogue process.
Iranians also participate in interfaith dialogue on a governmental level. Dr. Amir Akrami
worked as the Director for the Center for Interreligious Dialogue in Iran under President
Mohammad Khatami. Khatami’s presidency was characterized by open and active promotion of
dialogue among civilizations. Roughly 80% of the dialogue conducted by the Center at this time
was with Christian representatives from the Vatican, Church of England, Greek and Russian
Orthodoxy, and World Council of Churches (WCC). During meetings the groups would examine
the history of their relationship and decide a topic for their next discussion. Examples of
discussion topics include ethics, law, the role of women, and interpretations of religious texts.
Dr. Akrami noted that some challenges to this kind of dialogue involved a degree of mistrust that
Iranians often feel toward foreigners (particularly Westerners) coming into their country, in
addition to some internal dialogue issues due to the variety of political and ideological
differences among Iranian Muslims themselves.
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The openness toward interfaith dialogue exhibited by Khatami’s government did not
necessarily continue into the mid to late 2000’s. The activity of the Center for Interreligious
Dialogue decreased dramatically and some of the positive progress made was reversed during the
presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose government was characterized by insularity.
Nevertheless, the Center is currently in operation under Hassan Rouhani’s presidency. The
United States also has a governmental organization for political interreligious dialogue
introduced under the Obama administration. In 2013, Secretary John Kerry established the Office
of Religion and Global Affairs as a sector of the US State Department (Office of the Press
Secretary, 2016). According to Ed Martin, government officials like John Kerry and Douglas
Johnson recognize religion as the gap in American diplomacy. However, since the inauguration
of Donald Trump, who some Iranians would consider the “[American] Ahmadinejad,” US global
interfaith dialogue has also been scaled back.
Due to lack of governmental action, many Americans and Iranians may be skeptical of
the ability to produce practical political outcomes via interfaith dialogue. One Iranian scholar
who was interviewed, reasons:
“I think it is a mistake to think that interfaith dialogue can make a significant contribution
to peace between nations, because peace depends on the decisions of politicians and not
on the good will of those who engage in interfaith dialogue. This is not to deny, however,
that on occasion good relations fostered by interfaith dialogue can promote lobbying
efforts for peace, and sometimes can change a few people's minds so that they are more
skeptical about accusations made against members of other nations and faiths in the
media… [but] I certainly am under no illusion that learning tours and interfaith dialogues
are going to convince people like Trump that sanctions against Iran should be lifted.”

In truth, small-scale interfaith activities are not guaranteed to make real, macro political change.
Nevertheless, the bottom line is that diplomacy between the US and Iran cannot be reestablished
without a religious component. Spiritual belief systems dictate a majority of political action in
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Iran as an Islamic Republic. Therefore, a faith aspect is necessary in establishing a foundation for
structural change between the two nations.
Furthermore, many other Iranians, including the Deputy Foreign Minister (Dr.
Sajjadpour), believe in the positive effects of small-scale interfaith activities. When asked how
interfaith dialogue can promote peace between Iran and the US, Iranians scholars are quoted
saying, “I think we are living it. When there are good enough people on both sides change can
happen. The change might be small, but it is worthwhile;” and “A major solution to the problem
is making people talk to each other. You cannot expect change in one day.” Specifically, Dr.
Akrami argues that change in social/cross-cultural perceptions (such as the reduction of
prejudice) that result from engagement in interfaith activities, whether at an individual or small
group level, have a larger and more practical impact than one might believe:
“Unfortunately, a lot of good ideas, such as interfaith dialogue, stay at the level of talk
and do not translate into action. A lot of this has to do with politics, but at the same time
all of us should bear more responsibility to be more serious about our values and good
ideas. I do think that we need to foster a culture of good relationship and dialogue
between our intellectuals, ordinary people, athletes, artists, historians and so on to remove
a lot of misunderstandings, misperceptions and prejudices that exist between our
countries and cultures. Ignorance is the root cause of many problems and interfaith and
intercultural dialogue can be the best remedy here.”

Although interfaith dialogue on this level (e.g. dialogue conferences, learning tours, student
exchanges) may not directly result in the US government lifting sanctions against Iran, dialogue
creates a space for learning that can reduce prejudice and encourage those involved to advocate
for practical change.
Political sub-theories of change by means of interfaith dialogue recognize the opportunity
for the cooperation of both political and religious leaders to lead to relational and structural
change. Relational change reflects an alteration in attitudes of religious followers toward and in
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relation to the ‘other;’ when political leaders implement the message of relational change
engendered by religious leaders, it can lead to structural change (Neufeldt, 2011). Shia religious
leaders in Iran are extremely influential in both the public and private spheres. When Iranian
religious leaders publically endorse a particular religious or political message, they can catalyze
relational and structural change. According to Neufelt (2011), when politicians give religious
leaders a platform to voice religious concerns within the public sphere, religious followers are
less likely to engage in violence motivated behavior. Likewise, research shows that individual
participation in interfaith groups is an effective catalyst for political participation. A 2017 study
(Todd, Boeh, Houston‐Kolnik, & Suffrin) on the political action of individuals from 25 interfaith
groups across 35 US states found that participation in an interfaith group where individuals share
community information and events predicted an increase in political action. As a result, research
studies and theories of change support that the incorporation of religion in the political sphere
can lead to positive political change.

Iran as an Islamic Republic
Coming from a country built on the foundation of religious freedom, it can be difficult for
Americans to rationalize and comprehend the synthesis of a religious state, or implementing
interfaith dialogue for means of political peacemaking. “Much of the rest of the world accepts
the idea that government must be secular and religion must be private,” states an Iranian scholar.
Many Americans view Iran purely as a theocracy rather than a democracy. However, the general
public either directly or indirectly elects all Iranian political leaders. Sheikh Rezazadeh argues
that Iran is just as much of a democracy as the US, primarily due to America’s Electoral College
model. On the other hand, he does admit that a weak point in the Islamic Republic’s democratic
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system is the heavy vetting of presidential and parliamentary candidates by religious leaders.
Although incorporating politics with religion can be problematic, many of the moral and ethical
values based in religious tradition support equality and an appreciation for human life. Ayatollah
Boroujerdi advocates for people to incorporate ethical and moral values into politics by
encouraging them to endorse political candidates who do not violate people’s rights.
When it comes to global conflict, Ayatollah Boroujerdi proclaims that people are not
typically the cause, instead it is governments working for their own self-interests. Many Iranians,
including the Deputy Foreign minister, recognize the division between government leaders and
the general populace: “You cannot equate people with their leaders. Take Stalin or Hitler for
example;” “The people are not the same as the government. Government is like chess. [The
leaders are the players and we are just the pieces].” Iranian scholars attempt to further explain
this separation between 'the government’ and ‘the people.’

“There are positions of power in Iran which are not directly elected by the people, such as
the supreme leader, the head of judiciary and the members of the Guardian Council, as
opposed to positions that are directly elected such as the president or members of the
parliament. The separation that people talk about refers to this distinction. Many people
generally feel that the former is not responsive to their needs and demands while they
have a lot of power in their hands and the president, or more generally the executive, do
not have enough power to implement their programs that are approved by the people
through elections.”
“Iranians are often critical of their elected leaders, who are collectively known as "the
government" (doulat), even though they are generally loyal to the system of Islamic
governance (nezam). Those who are against the entire system are a small minority, which
is over-represented among Iranian expatriates living in Europe and North America. Those
who are against the system usually do not care much about which government is in power
(e.g. liberals or conservatives). Criticism of the president or his government by Iranians is
often misunderstood by Westerners for criticism of the system.”
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Despite the previously discussed issues with freedom of speech in Iran, even religious
scholars are able to be critical of their government and the challenges of having a religious state.
Another Iranian scholar recounts:
“Of course there are challenges [to an Islamic state]… [One] challenge is that since the
system in Iran is religious, mistakes made by Iranian governments are taken to reflect
badly on Shi'i Islam. Shi'i religious leaders in other countries (e.g. Iraq, India, etc.) might
feel slighted because of the dominance of the Iranian religious leadership…”

The perception that mistakes made by the Iranian government reflect poorly on Shia Islam, is
also reminiscent of the Islamic Republic’s relationship to Ayatollah Khomeini. The Islamic
Revolution was built on the theory of Imam Khomeini, a political-religious theory that was not
necessarily accepted by all scholars. As a result, criticism of the Islamic Republic can not only
appear as a criticism of Shia Islam, but also criticism of Imam Khomeini, who is revered by
many as the rescuer of the Iranian people from the Shah and manipulative Western powers.
As devout Muslims who also participate in interfaith activities, many Iranian Shia
scholars see the disadvantages of living in an Islamic Republic for those from a minority
religious group. Dr. Akrami recalls feeling “caught in the middle” during his work at the Center
for Interreligious Dialogue: “Having a religious government has its challenges. On the one hand
I want the country to prosper and flourish, and attend to Muslim values. But on the other hand I
want to be positive of people of other faiths… The golden rule is to put yourself in others shoes.”
Other religious scholars discuss the treatment of religious minorities in the Islamic Republic:
“I do think that the religious state in Iran, despite its advantages, has failed to bring about
a just and prosperous society that we think Islam and the revolution seek to establish. The
main reason is that a religious state normally requires giving dominance to a specific
interpretation of the religion [Twelver Shiism] and, therefore, other interpretations [e.g.
Sunnis, other Shiite sects, etc.) are deprived of being treated on an equal footing, let alone
those who do not follow the official religion [e.g. Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, etc.],
hence it leads to an unjust society where human rights are violated.”
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“There are parts of the government, the reformers and moderates in particular, who wish
to treat the religious minorities in a just and fair manner but, unfortunately, there are
those who, for ideological reasons, think that Islam and Shiism must be given precedence
or priority over the adherents of other religions, hence they treat them as second-ranking
citizens. Ordinary people in general have historically treated them in a very fair and
humane fashion and do think of people of other faiths as equally Iranians with the same
rights and responsibilities.”
The faith traditions of the People of the Book are recognized in the 1979 Iranian Constitution and
the law forbids any violation of the rights for followers to practice those religions freely. For that
reason there is a certain ‘live and let live’ attitude when it comes to the treatment of minority
religious groups in Iran. For example, although the consumption of alcohol is illegal in the
Islamic Republic, some groups, such as the Armenian Christians, are permitted to have wine in
their homes and for religious ceremonies. The government tends to turn a blind eye to such
behavior, a fact that many Iranians know and some take advantage of.
Governmentally, religious minorities have their own representation in the Iranian
parliament. There are two seats reserved for Armenian Christians, one for the Assyrian
Christians, one for the Jewish community, and one seat for the Zoroastrian community (Pierce,
2008). In truth the representation of minority seats in parliament is actually greater than the
percentage of minorities in Iranian society. Furthermore, the Iranian government recognizes
religious minorities’ legal jurisdiction over their own communities in domestic matters (such as
marriage, divorce, and inheritance law) (Pierce, 2008). That being said, certain positions in the
Iranian government (mostly those of higher ranks) require individuals to be Muslim.
Despite some laws and other protections for minority religious groups in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, most minorities face a number of challenges and institutionalized
discrimination. Religious minorities are not allowed to propagate or missionize their religions.
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For up to ten years after the Islamic Revolution, the Bible could not be published in Iran.
Currently, Muslims are also forbidden to convert from Islam. A Zoroastrian carpet salesmen says
that he does not like to tell others about his religious identity because he is afraid the government
will take his money away. Additionally, since its inception in the late nineteenth century, the
Baha’i religious group has been heavily discriminated against and persecuted in Iran. The Baha’i
were considered heretics by the ulema, heresy or shirk in this sense being the most serious sin in
Islam. In August 1980 all nine members of the Baha’i National Spiritual Assembly of Iran were
arrested and never seen again (Axworthy, 2013). The Baha’i faith is not even studied at the
University of Religions and Denominations in Qom, because the Islamic Republic does not
recognize the Baha’i religion.
In a religious state it is nearly inevitable that a particular religion or religious
denomination will have preferential treatment. That being said, individuals from some minority
religious groups in Iran assert that the country has always been their home and they are content
with the freedoms they have. The Jewish community can trace its lineage in Iran back to the
Babylonian exile. A Jewish representative from a synagogue in Tehran claims that there are no
real challenges for the Jewish community in Iran: “We have our lives, shops, freedom to
worship, everything.” If needed the Iranian government also provides services and protection to
minority religious communities, in addition to allocating funds for the upkeep of Jewish
synagogues and Christian churches (Pierce, 2008). Morteza, a Shia Muslim recounts:
“I personally heard from several members of the minority groups, especially Christians
and Jews, that many people treat them much kinder when they realize that they belong to
the minority groups. A Jewish person told me that every time that he goes to a
governmental office, he gets a better reception if he tells them that he is Jewish! This is
because in the Iranian popular culture, treating the minorities and also the guests with
kindness and respect is very important.”
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This tradition of kindness and hospitality that Morteza refers to is truly exemplified by the
Iranian people. Despite the fears that Westerners may have of Iran, Americans who have traveled
to the country speak very highly of how they were welcomed with open arms by everyday
Iranians (Shellenberger, 2013). That said, the dichotomy of the government vs. the people
consequently infiltrates daily social interaction, in addition to the spheres of economics, politics,
and religion.

Implementation of Interfaith Dialogue & Peacemaking
Open engagement is a mode of peacemaking that refuses to permit division and illusory
powers to define whom one’s enemies are (Huebner, 2016). In the case of the United States and
Iran, past administrations have determined the enemy status that has nearly irradiated any
diplomacy between the two countries. When it comes to development and peacebuilding
strategies, governmental self-interest is often at odds with the needs and well-being of local
populations (Theissen, 2013). That being said, current interfaith engagement outside of the
political realm has reopened avenues for positive relations between the US and Iran. Iranian
religious scholars engaging in interfaith work contend that, “[Interfaith dialogue can promote
peace between the US and Iran by] making more opportunities for encountering and dialoging on
our common crisis with mutual respect and balanced rights.” This sense of mutual respect
requires a synthesis of Western and Islamic interfaith dialogue practices. It is insufficient to
apply dialogue practices that maintain the status quo, or to simply impose western models
without acknowledging their limitations, particularly in a multi-cultural setting (Abdullah, Akay,
Hassanzadeh & Tabari, 2016). The following provides an analysis of an Islamic model for
dialogic peacemaking practices and values, as well as a cross-cultural example of interfaith

44

activity by Christian Americans in a Muslim majority region.

Islamic Studies Model for Conflict Analysis - C.R. SIPPABIO
Western conflict resolution techniques are implemented with implicit cultural
assumptions, including an emphasis on individualism, materialism, and cost-benefit analyses
(Abu-Nimer, 2013). Furthermore, these Western models often assume the core problem is in
communication, an analysis that discounts deeply rooted structural conflicts and the asymmetric
power structures at play (Abu-Nimer, 2013). For this reason it is unproductive to implement a
solely Western dialogue model in this cross-cultural context. Nevertheless, faculty and students
at the Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences (GSISS) in Virginia illustrated a
framework for conflict analysis that provides an avenue for peacemaking from an Islamic
perspective [see Appendix Figure 2.1]. This model, referred to as C.R. SIPPABIO (Context,
Relationship, Sources, Interests, Positions, Parties, Attitudes/Feelings, Behavior, Intervention
and Outcome/Stage), was developed to ease the analysis of the different stages of conflict
resolution (Abdullah et al., 2016). The most important elements of this conflict analysis
framework are conflict elements, contextual factors, and the relationship between the parties
involved (Abdullah et al., 2016). The contextual factors were previously discussed in the
beginning of this research. That said, the conflict elements and relationship between the US and
Iran must be further broken down and examined in order to fully understand the applications,
values, and limitations of the C.R. SIPPABIO model.
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Conflict Elements
According to the C.R.SIPPABIO model there are eight essential elements of conflict:
sources, interests, positions, parties, attitudes, behavior, intervention, and outcome (Abdullah et
al., 2016). These conflict elements and the means of addressing them are rooted in Islamic
perspectives of conflict intervention. In order to illustrate the conflict elements most central to
the case of the United States and Iran, there will be an examination of conflict interests, parties
and intervention, in addition to how each are enacted and conceptualized from an Islamic
perspective.
The dimensions of interests from an Islamic perspective relate to the duality of
preventing harm and causing good. In keeping with Abdullah, et al. (2016), “any interest
preventing good or causing harm to the individual or society, whether it is in this life or in the
hereafter” is not considered a real goal in an Islamic value system. The dualism of preventing
harm while also causing good therefore involves Islamic ideals of collectivism and is not limited
to this lifetime. In believing in the accountability of the Day of Judgment, the reward or
punishment of God in the hereafter, Muslims struggle to be just and fair in their relationships and
goals in conflict resolution (Abdullah et al., 2016). Goals in the dualistic model can be positive
or negative: positive goals are aimed toward attaining a desired future outcome, while negative
goals involve the avoidance of an unwanted future state (Abdullah et al., 2016). Arguably the
United States has a positive goal of attaining control and security over the Iranian economy, in
doing so maintaining the safety of the American public and American governmental interests. On
the other hand, Iran has a negative goal of avoiding economic depression and Western
dominance. The interests of the parties in conflict are consequential in reaching a point of
negotiation and determining the role of the parties involved.
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From an Islamic perspective, the role of parties is embedded in the notion of ummah
rather than the Western emphasis on autonomy. In the Quran, God commands Muslims to single
out individuals within the ummah to act as representatives to fulfill the interests of the greater
good: “Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoying what is
right, and forbidding what is wrong; they are the ones to attain felicity; Ye are the best of
peoples, evolved for mankind, enjoying what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in
Allah” (3:104; 3:110). Not only does God command Muslims to choose those of good nature
among them as leaders, but also extolls those leaders for the goodness they enact for the
community. The members of the ummah and the leaders representing them are both considered
parties in a conflict scenario. Parties as another conflict element refer to the individuals, groups,
communities or nations participating in a conflict. Parties can be divided into three levels
(primary, secondary, and tertiary) in terms of their relation to and distance from a particular
conflict. Primary parties are those who have a direct vested interest in the conflict (e.g. American
and Iranian governmental leaders); secondary parties are those who are indirectly vested in or
affect by the conflict (e.g. the American and Iranian general public); Tertiary parties are distant
from the conflict but still have a degree of vested interest (e.g. European Union, United Nations)
(Abdullah et al., 2016). Tertiary parties often act as mediators when the primary parties have
reached a stalemate in negotiation. That said, the role of parties is crucial to conflict resolution
and deciding whether third party intervention is necessary.
When it comes to negotiating conflict intervention observations and themes from Islamic
sources emphasize a preference for parties to make their own settlements. The following ayah
from the Quran addresses this outcome superiority in conflict resolution: “If they arrange an
amicable settlement between themselves; and such a settlement is best; even though men’s souls
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are swayed by greed. But if you do good and practice self-restraint, Allah is well-acquainted with
all that ye do” (4:128). The ethics of conflict intervention or mediation relate specifically to
relationships and balances of power. Neutrality is of utmost importance in conflict mediation,
however the involvement of a third party brings questions of ethics to light: Is empowering a
weaker party as a mediator being neutral? Can one truly be neutral if there is an imbalance of
power? (Abdullah et al., 2016). These questions are central to the discussion of intervention,
parties, and goals and must be examined in depth if third party negotiation is needed in a conflict
scenario.

Relationship
There are three components that contribute to the examination of relationship in the C.R.
SIPPABIO model: power, pattern, and bond (Abdullah et al., 2016). Both the C.R. SIPPABIO
model and the cultural studies model to religious literacy call for an analysis of the power
dynamics involved in social conflict. There are various types of power, and in the case of the
United States and Iran the US has clear resource and procedural power. The following are
definitions of these powers according to Abdullah et al. (2016): Resource power: The power
derived from being in control over resources; Procedural power: The power that one enjoys
from being in charge of decision-making procedures. Currently, the US has numerous sanctions
in place that deny Iranian’s access to resources (from nuclear power to medication) and have
significantly damaged the Iranian economy over the past five to ten years. Furthermore, US
procedural power originates from the Western ethnocentric ideals attached to orientalism. The
United States has used its influence in the global sphere to manipulate Middle Eastern resources
and encourage other nations to do the same. The power imbalance between the US and Iran must
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be addressed and reexamined if legitimate conflict resolution and peacemaking practices are to
ensue.
In addition to power, relationship in conflict analysis also involves pattern. Participating
parties often resort to and repeat certain patterns of behavior during conflict situations (Abdullah
et al., 2016). From an Iranian perspective, one of the patterns that the US government historically
adheres to is the constant implementation of sanctions and other restrictions that reinforce the
unjust US domination over the Middle East. Dr. Ed Martin contents that the one of the true
sources of historic animosity, from an American perspective, is Iran’s insistence on being
independent. When Khomeini came into Iran as a rising leader he made it clear to the Iranian
people that their nation was to be independent; Iran was not going to be part of the Soviet block
or in an alliance of NATO. Martin claims that the Iranian insistence on sovereignty and selfdetermination was difficult for the United States to accept, considering the influence the US
government had over Iran when the Shah was in place. On the other hand, a pattern that has been
exhibited by the Iranian government is the nation’s reluctance and at times complete disregard
for the regulations (namely nuclear) imposed by the United States and United Nations. These
conflict behaviors coincide to create a pattern where the US continues to restrict Iranian behavior
when it interferences with American interest, and Iran continues to assert its right to selfgovernance as a free nation. Inevitably, if this pattern continues it will only worsen the degree of
antithesis and no concrete change will be made.
The final component of relationship in the C.R. SIPPABIO model is bond. The bond or
attachment between parties within a conflict is tied to cultural meaning and social roles
(Abdullah et al., 2016). Accordingly, the C.R. SIPPABIO model emphasizes the establishment of
an equally understood bond. For the case of Iran and the United States this bond could be labeled
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differently depending on who labels and determines it (e.g. enemy vs. ally). The importance
then, is a shared understanding of what the current bond is between parties and what both parties
expect and wish that bond to be (whether it is the same or different as the current attachment).
The three components of relationship (power, pattern, and bond) are central to understanding the
current conflict and play a significant role moving forward with peacemaking strategies. From an
Islamic perspective, the way in which people operate and conceptualize relationship has dualistic
properties. Based in the concept of tawheed as the cornerstone of Islam, Muslims engage in a
dual dimensional relationship, relating to both the vertical and horizontal: The vertical aspect of
this Islamic relationship refers to Muslims’ relationship with God, while the horizontal relates to
how Muslims engage with and relation to others, in a way that recognizes others as a part of
creation according to divine revelation (Abdullah et al., 2016). Both dimensions are valuable
from an Islamic perspective, because building Islam in oneself involves Muslims fulfilling their
duty to Allah and to His creation (Abdullah et al., 2016).

Limitations
Islamic models of peacemaking are extracted from and dictated in the Qur’an and Sunnah
as divine sources (Abdullah et al., 2016). The challenges that arise are then indicative of the
source material, and the rationalization and interpretation of abstract religious doctrine by human
subjects. As is true with all religions, disagreement in the interpretation of religious texts and
doctrine can lead to internal conflict and even division in religious communities (e.g. Sunnis and
Shiites, Catholics and Protestants). As a result, the variety of interpretations can also lead to
variation in peacemaking models. Religion and faith value are not quantifiable, so
compartmentalizing them to be applied to a tangible, measurable model can be problematic.
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Additionally, utilizing a conflict resolution model that is centered on religious doctrine ignores
those involved in the conflict, who do not participate in or adhere to a particular religious belief
system. Secular elements are also valuable to examine and include in any conflict resolution
model, particularly when the parties involved have secular values. What is difficult for many
religious individuals to understand is that the absence of religious faith does not always mean the
absence of morality. The process of adapting conflict resolution tools to include an Islamic
reality is necessary for relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. That said, a true holistic
method of peacemaking demands a synthesis of the cultural value systems of all parties involved:
Western and Eastern, American and Iranian, Christian and Islamic, religious and secular.

Cross-Cultural Example of Interfaith Work in Zanzibar
Due to the elements of power that influence global relationships, it is of upmost
importance to examine the role of Westerners coming into a Muslim majority region and
engaging in interfaith peacemaking. Peter and Christy Sensenig are a Christian-American couple
who work and live (along with their two young children) in Zanzibar, a Muslim majority
archipelago off the coast of East Africa. Similar to the demographic break down of Iran,
Zanzibar’s population is roughly 98% Muslim. In Zanzibar, Christy works as a healthcare
professional under the Health Improvement Project, while Peter works at the Zanzibar Interfaith
Center teaching intercultural relations. Living and working in Zanzibar provides the Sensenig’s
with a rich context for interfaith and intercultural knowledge sharing and peacemaking.
Although the group of islands is officially part of the mainland (Christian majority)
Tanzania, Zanzibar has its own parliament and presidency, influenced by Islamic jurisprudential
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governance [This does not mean Sharia law]. The Sensenigs address the difficulty of combining
religion and politics, and the need to steer clear of political interference as a Westerner. “It is not
wise for Western expats to come into a Muslim majority country and be overtly political in any
sort of way. We don’t want to be perceived as critical of Islam in a way that closes dialogue,”
Sensenig says. At the same time, Peter Sensenig wonders how political leaders view global
interfaith interactions: “Surely they’re able to see the value in developing a civil society in which
respect is [of chief importance], right? I don’t think that governments would be ambivalent about
this sort of thing, but [rather interfaith dialogue is] something that they would want to promote.”
Many governments and individuals who are opposed to engaging in interfaith dialogue
adhere to the stereotypes that those participating are compromising their faith and do not take
their faith seriously. There is a misconception that in order to have meaningful dialogue one has
to water down their particular views and only focus on commonality, a view that is reminiscent
of reductive pluralism. However, dictating interfaith engagement by these misconceptions
delegitimizes dialogue and, in a sense, dehumanizes the other. The Sensenigs challenge
Christians to consider the dangers of this ideology as a religious community: “Do we put
anything, including our deepest-held religious convictions, above the human dignity and value of
the people around us? Human need and human dignity trumps everything, including religion.
Therefore it is important to recognize and address what the Sensenigs refer to as “blind spots,” or
any convictions that hold individuals back from seeing the human dignity in others.
According to the Sensenigs, “privilege comes with blind spots,” and Westerners can
easily fall into the trap of the white-savior complex. The white-savior complex adheres to
orientalist attitudes that promote Westerners as superiors who are thus able to come into foreign
nations and act as the heroes, while the native population is portrayed as helpless and
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consequently needing saved. Colonial ethnocentrism clearly persists into modern day
international relations. Therefore, a dialogic approach to interfaith peacemaking requires delicate
communication, an understanding of power dynamics, cultural sensitivity, and emotional
intelligence among other traits. Ultimately, acting as a Westerner in this role requires respect.
For the Sensenig’s, respect in this context means learning Swahili (the official language of
Tanzania/Zanzibar), dressing in a culturally appropriate manner (often wearing hijab/head
covering as a woman), and affirming cultural-religious activities (such as fasting and prayer).
Not only are there challenges to entering into global interfaith work as a Westerner, but
also gaining the support to engage in such work from other Western sources. The Sensenig
family receives financial support almost exclusively from congregations in the United States and
individual donors. That being said, more often then not Christian organizations will allocate
funds toward traditional evangelism, which measures its success on conversion rather than
mutual respect and peacemaking. According to Peter Sensenig, churches and donors expect to
hear that the opportunity to share the Gospel is taken advantage of, but that is exactly what most
Muslims fear. Christy Sensenig argues that, “when you enter into debate it can stand in the way
of people actually encountering Jesus.” Laughing, Peter Sensenig adds, “I don’t have any
urgency about saving Muslims from anything. I value our Muslim friends and I like the freedom
to see people as people, not really thinking of them in terms of what I would hope they would
be.” In order to navigate this relationship between Western funding and traditional Western
ideals of evangelism, the Sensenigs attempt to present the reality of their vision, which can
challenge some Christians’ assumptions of what mission should be. The Sensenigs hope that in
sharing knowledge of cultural context and the limitations of the traditional model of Christian

53

missionary work, Christian sponsors will find themselves wondering what it looks like to bear
witness to faith that is centered on Jesus but is also very respectful of Muslims.
Although there are numerous challenges to entering into a Muslim majority region and
engaging in interfaith dialogue as a Westerner, the process can be extremely productive with an
open and understanding mindset. Peter Sensenig recalls attending a dialogue conference in
Uganda hosted by Campalla University (an Islamic University in the Christian majority country).
The main gathering including more than a thousand Muslims, Christians, religious officials,
community leaders, and university students. During a discussion on the book, “A Muslim and A
Christian in Dialogue” by David Shenk and Badru Kateregga, Sensenig sat beside the Iranian
Ambassador to Uganda. At one point the Iranian Ambassador turned to Sensenig and said, “We
need to get this book in Farsi.” Sensenig contends that it takes significant power and influence to
make something like the translation of an interfaith dialogue book to come to fruition, especially
in a context such as Iran where religious resources are heavily guarded. Be that as it may, many
Iranians recognize the positive impact that interfaith engagement can have on civil society and
international relations. Accordingly, Westerners entering into these spaces must be held
accountable by participating in interfaith interactions with certain cultural understandings, so as
not to inflict further damage.
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META-COMMUNICATIVE TOUR ANALYSIS
The meta-communicative aspect of this research project involves a critical analysis and
description of a learning tour in the Islamic Republic of Iran, which I participated in. The tour
took place between April 7th and 22nd, 2018 and was sponsored by the International Institute for
Islamic Thought and Hikmat International Institute for Oriental Wisdom and Spirituality
(formerly the Hikmat International Institute for Religious and Cultural Studies). This analysis
includes a broad overview of the trip itinerary as well as tour group demographics and examples
of interfaith exchange of knowledge. The learning tour was orchestrated for the purpose of
educating Americans and Canadians on Iranian culture and religion, with a primary focus on
Shia Islam. For that reason much of the time in Iran was spent visiting various Shia mosques and
shrines, historical sites, religious and educational foundations, local restaurants, traditional
bazaars, and Iranian homes. Representatives from the Jewish community in Tehran, Armenian
Christians in Isfahan, and Zoroastrians in Yazd were also visited and interviewed. In offering this
meta-communicative overview readers have the opportunity to gain insight into the current
interfaith activities taking place in the Islamic Republic of Iran and their effectiveness in
educating foreign Westerners on different aspects of the country’s culture. Although the
following analysis is written in a less academic and more user-friendly format, it provides a
realistic window into the experience of participating in interfaith cultural exchange.

Experiencing Iran
Immediately upon landing in Tehran, a message came over the intercom requesting all
women to cover their heads in accordance with the laws of the Islamic Republic. I was in a new
country, a new culture; this time I was the “other.” Our tour group spent sixteen days traveling
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across Iran to six different major cities (Tehran, Qom, Isfahan, Shiraz, Yazd, and Mashhad) [See
Figure 2.1 for a general map of our travels]. Our group consisted of five Canadians, twelve
Americans, and our two Iranian guides Morteza and Sayyed. Roughly 80 percent of our
American-Canadian group identified as Christian (nearly half of whom consider themselves
Mennonite), while the remaining individuals included a Muslim woman, a male Zoroastrian
priest, and a Jain couple. Our tour guides, of course, were both devout Shia Muslims.
The application process for acquiring visas to the Islamic Republic of Iran was more
intensive for the American nationals compared to our Canadian counterparts. The Canadian
nationals taking part in the Iranian cultural tour received verification for their visa acceptances
by early February, but we Americans were left waiting in the dark until March 28th, a week and a
half before our scheduled departure. As a university student conducting research approved and
supported by a state university, I had additional hoops to jump through. Luckily I was allowed to
travel with a tourist visa rather than a student visa, a difficulty that likely would have prevented
me from traveling to Iran altogether. Additionally, due to the fact that the Islamic Republic of
Iran is on the US State Department travel advisory warning list under the level “do not travel,” I
was required to sign forms stating that Kutztown University was not liable for any type of
ransom if I were kidnapped during my travels. There were three individuals (2 American and 1
Canadian) who’s visa requests were rejected, and therefore could not join us on the trip. As is the
case with nearly any nation and visa processes, we were given no answer or justification for their
rejection. Additionally one of the individuals rejected, Harry Huebner a Canadian, had traveled
to Iran numerous times before.
The first site we visited on our cultural tour was one of the summer palaces of
Mohammad Reza Shah. The palace was filled with intricate plaster carvings and walls covered in
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cloth with bulletproof windows. The air itself was filled with a sense of decadence. After
viewing a small fraction of the luxury enjoyed by the Pahlavi Shahs, our group drove to the
humble residence of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. The juxtaposition of these leaders’ lifestyles
was extremely powerful to witness. Looking into the room where the Ayatollah met with
presidents, prime ministers, and kings, we saw a single rugged couch covered with a plain white
bed sheet. The room was nearly empty except for a couple pictures and books, compared to the
Shah’s official dinning halls filled with rows of ornate furniture and 100 square yards of silk rugs
hand made by 9-year-old children. Pondering these extremes, you begin to feel a humble respect
for the Ayatollah Khomenei and the place that he holds in the hearts of the Iranian people.
Outside of traveling to religious and cultural sites, a significant portion of the tour was
dedicated to formal meetings with scholars and representatives from various institutions and
religious groups. These institutions included the Iranology Foundation & Museum, Tehran Peace
Museum, and University of Religions and Denominations. Arguably the most noteworthy
interview was with the Representative of Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani in Qom. Before the
meeting, our group was given a tour of the museum where al-Sistani keeps all of the priceless
gifts he/his representative receives from the kings and government leaders he is typically in
dialogue with. These gifts ranged from hand painted boomerangs from Australia to engraved
swords from Saudi kings. The most precious gift, however, was a magnificent Qur’an made with
313 Iraqi Dur-e Najaf gemstones, engraved with more than a hundred surahs (verses). Our
meeting with the Representative, and son-in-law, of al-Sistani lasted for several hours including
coffee and lunch. According to our Iranian guides, ordinary people would be lucky to have only
fifteen minutes with an Iranian cleric of this status. Contrarily, we were welcomed without
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hesitation, went through absolutely no form of security, and left with full minds and full
stomachs.
Although the learning tour was centered around our formal dialoguing sessions, it was the
cultural sharing that took place through informal dialogue that gave the truest picture of the
Iranian people. Informal dialogue took place during many walks of our tour. Meals at local
restaurants and strolls through luscious Persian gardens provided unique opportunities for
interaction with everyday Iranians. It was during these chance opportunities that I began to learn
what Iranian culture really was. You can see Iranian culture in the difference of head coverings
between the women wearing all black chadors in Qom and the more progressive women in
Isfahan, struggling to keep their hijabs perched ever so slightly on the backs of their heads. You
can hear Iranian culture in the soft speech of a 7-year-old girl reciting poetry at the Shrine of
Hafez, or the intensely mesmerizing vibrato of a man singing to his guests at a dinner party.
Iran is more than just an Islamic Republic; it is a nation built on the great history of the
various Persian empires. Yet, in the shadows of these historic landmarks, you can also see the
loss of Iranian culture at the hands of Western greed. Walking through the minimalistic exhibits
at the National Museum of Iran, you feel a sense of history missing. The gift shop sells replicas
of the famed Cyrus cylinder, a prized Persian artifact dating back to the 6th century, which is kept
not in the National Museum of Iran, but in the British Museum in London. I felt ashamed
walking through museums and the mighty ruins of Persepolis, coming from a history that built
itself on the exploitation of other great nations and people.
The last stop of our trip was the northern city of Mashhad, which is home to the Shrine of
Imam Reza, the second largest shrine in the world (the first being the Ka’ba Shrine in Mecca).
The night we arrived in Mashhad was the birthday celebration of Imam Hussein. As we walked
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the streets people handed out candies and tea to everyone who passed. In addition to the
magnificent cultural sights of Mashhad, this is where we had the culmination of our interfaith
exchange. During a conference hosted by the faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies at
Ferdowsi University, five Iranian representatives from the University faculty along with three
American representatives from our group shared research and experience on a variety of
interfaith topics. These topics included (but were not limited to): methodology on peaceful
interpretations of Islam, the life example of Emir Abdulkadir, interfaith relationships between
Muslims and Christians in the US, peacemaking courtship, and the use of water as a tool of war.
Following the conference our group enjoyed lunch with the university faculty and had the
opportunity to continue these discussions in a more informal setting. After our dialogue
conference at Ferdowsi University, our group enjoyed a goodbye coffee and reception together,
reflecting on the joys of our travels and receiving gifts of fresh Persian saffron from our gracious
hosts.

Returning Home
Finding your way home after a life-changing travel experience is always bittersweet. The
sad truth about leaving Iran in April 2017 is the reality that there is no certainty of your return.
The current relationship between the US and Iran is too unpredictable and with Trump’s
international agenda, conditions are only getting worse. So you find yourself taking just a few
more pictures and trying to memorize every crease in the smiling faces of your Iranian
companions and hosts, because you do not know if you will ever see them again. But returning
home also means sharing the true Iran with America. During our time with the Representative of
Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, he made one request of our group: “Go home and tell [America] how
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you were treated here. How the Muslims treated you here.” I can wholeheartedly say that
nowhere else in the world have I been shown such unadulterated hospitality as I experienced in
Iran. Whether it was being given food and invitations for home-cooked dinners by Muslim
women walking through the gardens of Tehran, or being showered with gifts as honored guests
of the Zoroastrian community in Yazd, Iranian hospitality was felt by every one of our group
during nearly every moment of our travels. For many foreigners, being an “other” in Iran is being
treated as a guest.
For those who are “othered” in the US as a religious minority, returning home to the
United States can be a harsh reminder of that reality. This is the case for my friend Awatef, who
despite the fact that she is an American citizen and has lived in the US for decades, is treated
differently than most Americans due to her religious identity as a Muslim. After arriving home I
received an email from Awatef describing her experience traveling home from Iran:
“Landing in New York from Istanbul, I was greeted almost at the door of the airplane by a
security officer (who was apparently waiting for me). For about 90 minutes I was asked to give
information about my family and purpose of my visit to Iran and the places I visited. I explained
that I was part of an interfaith group in a learning tour to learn about the history and culture of
Iran. The agent was pleasant and courteous, however he searched my suitcases and he asked for
my phone, which he took to another agent. I do not know if he downloaded anything. I was too
tired to question his request. I hope that no one should be apprehended at an airport with no valid
reason, just for having a certain faith or for coming from a certain place.”
In comparison, I landed in Baltimore after flying from Vienna. Traveling with an older male
family friend (of no blood relation), I walked into the short Mobile Passport line after finding my
way off the plane. Stepping into place at the front of the line, the US customs officer simply
asked me where I had traveled and what I did there. I answered that I was coming from Iran,
where I participated in an interfaith cultural tour. He scanned my passport, stamped my forms
and let me pass with ease. The officer called my family friend, Patrick Brady, next. All Patrick
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told the officer was that he was traveling with me, and the officer asked no further questions; he
scanned, stamped, and we were free to go.
In my own experience, I now expect to be chosen for additional “random screening”
when flying internationally, due to my flight records and having an Iranian visa in my passport.
However, my encounters with extra security screenings pale in comparison to the relative
interrogations awaiting Awatef. One’s religious or national identity should not preclude ethical
treatment. Discrimination and prejudice against another’s identity is a significant breach in
human dignity and a major cause of conflict (Abdullah et al., 2016). Although the multitudes of
identities we hold (religious, ethnic, racial, gender, etc.) specifically shape our sense of self, it is
our shared human identity that should dictate our interactions with others. The following Persian
poem by the famous Shirazi Sa’adi (1210-91) exemplifies the salience of a shared human
identity:
Human beings are members of one another
All created from the same precious jewel.
When, in the course of life,
Pain comes to a member,
The other members cannot remain at peace.
When you do not grieve at the suffering of others
You cannot be called by the name “human.”
This poem is not only on the tongues of nearly every Iranian, but also inscribed above the
entryway to the United Nations building in New York City (Shellenberger, 2013). No American
should be interrogated at the airport due to their particular religious identity, and no Iranian
should be kept from traveling to the United States because of where they were born.
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CONCLUSION
This study provides a Muslim-centric approach to interfaith dialogue, in order to
emphasize a sense of cross-cultural understanding to a primarily Western-Christian audience.
Collaborative efforts from Iranian locals and Mennonite communities in the United States and
Canada have opened up the opportunity for religious peacemaking for both inter- and intra-state
purposes. Documenting the unique relations of interfaith dialogue within the Islamic Republic of
Iran can inform innovative peacemaking strategies to religious conflicts and anti-Muslim
sentiment in the United States and abroad. Additionally, this research has the potential to not
only innovate, but also reestablish diplomatic ties between the United States and Islamic
Republic of Iran. The significance associated with understanding the perspective of the ‘other’ is
paramount for the success of any social relationship, including those within the sphere of
international diplomacy.
The American image-framing of Iranians and Muslims as the stranger, a demonized other
rooted in ethnocentric orientalist attitudes, has a continual negative impact on international
diplomacy and domestic affairs. The underlying assumptions plaguing Islam as a religion of
radicalism and violence is often based in hypocrisy and ignores a holistic view of religion and
how religion manifests in society. By incorporating Iranian Shia Muslim perspectives on topics
of peace, interfaith engagement, and religion’s intersection with politics, this study provides an
example of fresh cross-cultural communication and understanding. Additionally, the inclusion of
a relational peacebuilding model (C.R.SIPPABIO) grounded in Islamic principles and values sets
the tone for mutual respect and collaborative peacemaking. That being said, an
acknowledgement of the power dynamics involved with such conflicts is also essential to the
realistic development of positive change between the US and Iran. The complex role of
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Westerners entering into foreign nations with unfamiliar socio-religious practices is riddled with
colonial undertones. For this reason, examples of Christian-Americans entering into these roles
in a respectful and culturally sensitive manner must be highlighted. Lastly, an appreciation of
small successes in cultural exchange and interfaith knowledge sharing support the
comprehension of change as a process, requiring constructive effort from political leaders,
researchers, NGO’s, and ordinary citizens alike.
When it comes to the current debate, scholars and politicians question how much religion
should be incorporated into politics and why dialogue with the Islamic Republic of Iran is
necessary. The inherently antagonistic stance of closing oneself off and refusing to speak with
another is what requires justification; dialogue is its own justification (Huebner, 2016).
Furthermore, politicians often fail to acknowledge the socio-cultural importance of religion and
its intersection with the political sphere. Therefore a basic understanding of religious literacy as
stated in the cultural studies approach is absolutely necessary when engaging in diplomacy with
a religious state, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran. Progressive Mennonite communities (often
associated with Mennonite Central Committee) arguably have the greatest potential to foster
peaceful dialogue with Iran, based on their current and past relational exchanges, as well as their
shared philosophical/spiritual framework. Given the current evolution of the American political
stance toward the Islamic Republic of Iran and the widening of intolerance, conducting research,
heightening advocacy, and the development and implementation of concrete steps toward peace
are extremely valuable and relevant.
Further research on this topic should include continual analyses of current interfaith
activity with the Islamic Republic of Iran both within and without government intervention.
Although there are few sources of this information between the US and Iran, analyses of more
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positive relations between Iran and European nations (such as Germany) could be extremely
insightful moving forward. Unfortunately, Western news sources and accounts detailing past and
current conditions in Iran relating to democracy and attitudes toward America are often
unreliable and misconstrued. Therefore, journalists and researchers alike have a responsibility
not only to cite accurate sources, but also to conduct ethical and veracious primary research.
When truth is swept under the rug, radicalism overrides ethics, and ethnocentrism dictates
diplomacy, the United States and Islamic Republic of Iran both suffer. Individuals and leaders of
both nations owe it to themselves, to the other, and to the world to foster mutual respect and
harmony. Currently, interfaith dialogue provides an avenue for that very sentiment. If one nation
is reaching out their hand in a gesture of peace, human dignity dictates the need to take it.
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APPENDIX
Figures
1.1
Timeline of Important Dates in Iran-US History

1950

1953: Western (US & UK) overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed
Mosaddegh

1960

1970

1980

1979 (Jan.): Shah flees to US seeking medical treatment and is welcome by
President Jimmy Carter
1979 (Feb.): Ayatollah Khomenei returns to Iran at the success of the Islamic
Revolution
1979 (Nov.): Student radicals take control of the US embassy
1980: Start of the Iran-Iraq War
1981: US embassy hostages are released
1988 (July): US shoots down Iranian civilian airliner, killing 290 passengers
and crew
1988 (Aug.): Iran-Iraq War ends with UN brokered ceasefire

1990

2002: President Bush's State of the Union "axis of evil" speech
2000

2010

2015: The Iran Nuclear Deal is arranged between the P5+1 (US, UK, China,
Russia, France, and Germany) and Iran
2018: President Trump backs out of the Iran Deal and imposes more
sanctions on Iran
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3.1
Map of Travel Across Iran
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Photos

Photographed by: Sayed Ruhollah Rastitubar

Tehran

Group photo of our American-Canadian tour group and guide Morteza (far right)
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Photographed by: Kristyn Rohrer

Tehran

Golestan Palace, the former royal complex of the Qajar Dynasty
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Photographed by: Kristyn Rohrer

Tehran

View of Tehran skyline from the Milad Tower
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Photographed by: Kristyn Rohrer

Tehran

Iranian women enjoying a picnic at the Garden of Tulips
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Photographed by: Kristyn Rohrer
Tehran street with signs/photos of Ayatollah Khamenei (left) and Ayatollah Khomeini (right)
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Photographed by: Calvin Friesen

Yazd

Our wonderful tour guides/friends, Sayed (left) and Morteza (right)
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Photographed by: Calvin Friesen
Morteza with his son Ali at the Shrine of Hafez
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Shiraz

Photographed by: Kristyn Rohrer

Qom

Tomb of unknown Iranian soldiers from the Iran-Iraq War. A sign outside the tomb reads, “The
Blessed Resting Place of 14 Anonymous Martyrs Who Gave Their Lives for Islam in the Holy 8
Year Defense (1980-1988) Against Saddam’s Tyrant Regime, And the Arrogant Superpowers
Supporting It.”
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Photographed by: Kristyn Rohrer

Tehran

Meeting with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, Dr. Seyed Kazem Sajjadpour (center). Ed Martin
sits next to him (left).
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Photographed by: Calvin Friesen

Qom

Meeting with Ayatollah Alavi Boroujerdi (far right) at the Shrine of Lady Fatima Ma’sumeh
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Photographed by: Kristyn Rohrer

Qom

Ceiling at the Shrine of Fatima Ma’sumeh
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Photographed by: Kristyn Rohrer

Qom

A painting of Ayatollah al-Sistani (right) and a photograph of his Representative/son-in-law
(left) above a showcase of gifts in al-Sistani’s Museum.
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Photographed by: Calvin Friesen

Qom

Morteza (left) next to the Representative of Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani (right) in religious attire.
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Photographed by: Kristyn Rohrer

Isfahan

Outside view of the Masjed-e Jadid-e Abbasi or Shah Mosque in Imam Square.
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Photographed by: Kristyn Rohrer

Isfahan

Inside the Shah Mosque
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Photographed by: John & Kathryn Fairfield

Mashhad

Shrine of Imam Reza on the evening of Imam Hussein’s birthday celebration
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Photographed by: Kristyn Rohrer

Shiraz

Interior of the Nasir-ol-molk Mosque or the Pink Mosque
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Photographed by: Calvin Friesen

Shiraz

Me kneeling next to Ali in the courtyard of the Pink Mosque
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